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THE DEMA 1' D FOR CREDIT UNION SHARES
\\ illiam R. Reichen, tein
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Cred!! unions repre~ent a uniqu_e type of financial intermediary. They
are organized a, nonprofit, coopera11ve.s limited 10 members associated b a
common bond. The RegulalJOn Q lype ceiling applicable to credit union Y_
se1 by !he Na1ional Credi! Union Admini,tration and is usually highe ths is
· ·
-r an
existing ce1 1mgs at other depornory institu1ions 1
. Several recent studies on the demand for financial a,se1s include credit
umon shares in a compos11e account with savings al other nonbank
depository instllulions.' Unles!> the demand relationship tor savings acc~unt\ in each in,1itu1ion is identical. the sludies are subject 10 aggregation
bias. And credit union officials. as will be d1,..:ussed below, contend tha1
!heir !>hares do nc1 behave the ,ame a, 01her savings accounts. This study
avoids 1he potential aggregation bias by conc~ntrating on 1he single financial asse1 - credit union shares.
The purpose of this paper is to e~1imate the demand for ,hares using
lime ,cries data Several institutional changes in the pas1 fifteen years apparent!~ produced substantial change~ in credn unions· financial environment. A, .... 111 be discussed belo\l.. the 1971-76 period appear, to be the
longest, continuous period in recent credit union history without major ins1itutional change. The i;11roduction of Federal ,hare 111,urance in January,
1971, and the legalization of sharedrafts in 1977 represent the boundaries of
this study.
This study allo"'s for an empirical analysis of se\eral key Mues.The
firs! issue concerns the responshcness of ~hares 10 their 0'l.n rate of return.
A second and rela1cd issue is the sePsitivity of shares 10 money market
pre~sure and periods of disintermed1a11on. f\tany aedit umon personnel
consider ,hare~ to be relatively immune to movements in in1eres1 rates -their
own or other short-term rates·.' This os1ensible insulation is often a11nbu1ed
10 1heir common bond of associa11on, ah hough the theoretical connec1ion 1s
never clearly spelled ou1. This "lraditional view" is succinctly expressed in
·1he NCUA Annual Repor,, "By vinue of their operations wirhin prescribed
field, of membership, credit urnom have tc-nded 10 be relati\ely insulated
from the direct and immediate 1mpac1 of credit and sa\'ings marker
developments "•
There have been t\l.0 previous studies on the demand for credit union
shares. In 1he firs! study, Ryland A. Taylor (I I] estimates 1he demand for
shares using 1965 cross-sectional dala. Be,;au\c of the many financial developments espec1all> w11hm the credit union system since the rnid-60's,
Taylor s study cannot confidently be considered characteristic of today's
credit union movement. ' Funhermore, Taylor's cross-secuonal approach to
the demand for shares suffers from an inability to ascenain the influence of
monev marker conditions on the demand for shares. This is particularly un·
desira.ble since, as previously mentioned, a major poin1 of disagreement
32

·,

among credit union personnel concerns the sensitivity of shares to alternative rates of return. By using time-series data thb study provides a
statistical a nalysis of this issue.
The second study, by Ronald Koot [6], estimates the demand for shares
using semiannual data over the 1960-73 period. Unfortunately he faib to
consider the impact of Federal share insurance on the demand function. If
the introduction of share insurance represents a structural change in the demand for shares, as will be asserted below, then Koot's model contains a
specification error rendering his results inconsistent. As we shall ~ee there
exists substantial statistical evidence, though admittedly of a nonrigorous
nature, that severely questions Koot 's implicit assumption of a stable demand relationship.
The impact of Federal insurance on the demand for shares and the reasons for limiting the estimation period to the 1971-76 period arc the topics
of the first section. The formulation and estimation of the demand for
credit union share\ is developed in the second section while the final section
presents a \ummary :-ind the conclusions of the study.

Federal Share Insurance and the Uemand !"or Share,
Prior to January 197 I, credit union shares lacked an insu.-ance program comparable to that available on ~avings in competing depository institutions. There was strong reaction to the introduction of Federal in~urance, especially in the larger accounts. In fact the reaction \,a, ~o strong
as to suggest that many member, view Federally-insured share, a\ a
substantially different "product" than the non m sured counterpart.
Total shares at federal credit unions grew twice as fast (1770'0) during
the first six years of Federal in~urance than in the previous six year period
(891l'o). ' Large accounts arc expected to be more sensitive than small accounb 10 alternative rates of return. Consequently, it is significant that the
proportion of total share, in large account\ (greater than $5.000) in.:reased
from 27.8 percent at year-end 1970 to 52.6 percent by year-end I 976. In
contrast, bet,\een 1965 and 1970 the proportion of large account, only increased from 20.9 percent to 27.8 percent. The doubling of the growth rate
of total share~ coupled with the significant ,hift toward large c\Cl'0llnb since
1971 lend clear and substantial support 10 the as~ertlon that the introduction of Federal in,urance rcpre~ents a structural change in the demand for
shares.
Empiri,·ally, a, large shares becorm: preportionately more important
the inters! rate parameters in the demand fu11c1ion increase in ab,olute
value. Assuming that the marginal propensity to ,a\c of large savers is
higher than the mps of small saver\, the income parameter ma> abo increase. In short, throretical consideration-, suggest that the introduction of
Federal share insurance altered mo,1 of the parameter, in the demand function; thus, the introduction of insurance cannot adequately be represented
by a single, or even a few, structural ,hifl variables.
Because Koor failed to consider and empirically account for the in-
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troduction of Federal insurance, his results must be v·iew d · h k ..
• ··
·
e wu s ept1c1sm
BY I1mumg
the e~t1mation period to the 1971-76 period th'
. ·
' is study avoids
this potential problem.
tormul:ition :ind E~tim:ition of the Demand for

hare~

The demand for shares is postulated in the traditional fash'
·
h · d
..
100. 1t IS
ypot
es1ze that ~hare,
are posu1velv· related to income and their
· own rate
,
.
ot return and negatJvclv related to the level of competition from th
·.
. . .
e money
. d h
mar k et an 01 er deposllory mst1tut1ons. In addition 10 the above f t
f
·
ors,
·
the extension o m~urance coverage from S20,000 to $40,000 in late ac
1974 is
expected to mcrease the demand for shares.
Empiri_cal estimatio_n requires the choice of a particular functional
form. Received theory mpulatcs that the demand function be cast in real or
constant-dollar term~. If it is assumed that the demand function is linear in
the \·ariables and homogeneous of first degree in prices and in the initial
~tock of a,set, then the demand function can be expressed in general terms
as:'
h

where
credit union shares (constant dollar)',
income (constant dollar),
the dividend rate on credit union shares,
\t\lP = money market pressure,
COi = the level of competition from other depository institutions, and
D
the extemion of ,hare coverage to $40,000 in October,
SH
Y
CU

1974.

It is necesary to choose specific series or variables 10 represent the abol'e
factor\. Perwnal income (Ypl and wage, and salaries (WS) are considered
as proxie!> for the income factor, Y. Becau,e credit unions deal solely v.ith
the hou,ehold sector, the wage~ and \alarie, series is examined in addition
to personal income, the more U\ual income series. In addition, one period
lagged value, of the income variable, (Ypl and WS1) arc also examined to
provide a partial test for the hypothesis that ,avings arc more closely related
to previous leveb of income.
Two !>erie, are examined as proxies for money market pressure. The
first proxy is ~imply the three month Treasury Bill rate, TB. The second
method employ5 the variable TB-CU, where CU is the dividend rate on
credit union shares.
The average intere\t rate on deposits in savings and loan associations is
examined as a proxy for the level of competition from other depository in·
stitutions, COi. There exist theoretical and stati5tical problems with the sav•
34

ings and loan series which increases in the sample_ peri~d due lar~ely to the
general shift in savings from_ pa,sboo_k accounts into time depo,1t: p~ying
higher interest rates. By moving into time accoun1s the saver loses hqu1d11y.
The higher yield on time deposits \hould be reduced by the value of the lost
liquidity to provide an accurate measure of the increase in total return. The
value of the lost liquidity cannot, of course, he accurately mea\ured. It 1s
uncertain, therefore, whether the average interest rate on all deposits at sav10
ings and loans adequately repre,ents CDI.
Statistically, thi, general shift to time deposits during the period
studied result in a first order correlation between the savings and loan
variable and credit union shares of .909. This high, casual correlation produces perverse changes in the size and sign of the other coefficients. Introduction of a time trend fails to eliminate the unwarranted resulb and
necessitates the rejection of the savings and loan variable a, a proxy for the
level of competition from other depository institutiom. Failure to incluue a
proxy for CDI is not belie\ed to greatly bia, the forthcoming results. 11
The increase in deposit insurance, D, is represented by a binary or
dummy intercept variable. It might be argued that the increase in share insurance, like the introduction of ,hare insurance. changed all the
parameter~ and is not adequately repre,enteu by a dummy intercept
variable. Howe\er, the introduction of Federal insurance affected all
members and potential member, whereas the increase in insurance CO\erage
only affected a very small percentage of members and potential member~."
The fact that thi\ institutional change occurred lat.:r in the period siudied
coupled \\ilh the fact that there wa, not another period of general credit
restraint suggesh that a dummy variable i~ a statistically reawnable method
of representing the insurance increa~e.
All combinations of the independ.:nt variables are tested using both
monthly and quarterly data and the lea,t ,quares regression technique. The
results are presented in Table I.
The results from all of the regressions arc eomistent. The si1e of the income coefficient only varie, slightly when lc,tcd with alternative meawre,
of money market pre,,ure. Like\\"ise, the ,ize of the money market pres,ure
coefficient is not very semitive to the choic.: of income series. The rigorous
nature of the re~ulls lend, con fidencc to l he regression,' ability to a~certain
the signficance of income and money market conditions on the demand for
shares.
With respect to the most appropriate specification of the independent
variables, personal income consistently yields a higher R2 value. Including
TB and_CU independently in the regressions consistently produces higher
R2 and R2 values than the rate differential, TB-CU. More importamly, the
rate differemial fails to exhibit statistical significance al the five percent
level in two of the quarterly regressions. The own-rate coefficient is always
greater than the absolute value of the cross-rate coefficient indicating that
members' reactions are greater to changes in the credit union dividend rate
than to equal change, in the Treasury bill rate. Thus, equal changes in these
35

rates should increa~e total ~hares. The failure of the rate differential to
allow for this possibility apparently account\ for its poorer statistical fit and
its occa~ional failure to demon~tratc \tatistical significance.
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The variable representing the extension of insurance coverage, D, is
always significant at the 5 percent level or better despite the limited number
of observations and the lack of a period of general credit restraint since the
institutional change."
It is unclear whether the results from the quarterly or monthly regressions are to be preferred for calculating the elasticities; the quarterly
estimates gain efficiency over the monthly counterparts from the removal of
autocorrelation, as measured by the Durbin-Watson d-statistic, but they
lose efficiency because they are based on only one-third the number of
observations." Fortunately, the similarity of the results makes the choice of
a "best" regression for estimating elasticities academic.
Estimates of the interest rate elasticities from regression I calculated at
the means of the variables are .95 for the own-rate elasticity and -.12 for the
cross-rate elasticity. This implies that a I percent (e.g. 607o to 6.060"0) change
in the dividend rate is expected to increase ~hares by . 95 percent. The crossrate el~tici1y is interpreted similarly.
Table 2 allows us 10 compare the sensitivity of credit union shares to
movements in their own rate of return and rates available on marketable
securities. Credit union shares own-rate elasticity is estimated to be roughly
the same size. though slightly higher, than the similar elasticities on other
deposit accounb. Thus this study doc;:s not support the hypothesis that
credit union shares are insensitive 10. or les~ sensitive than other accounts
to, movements in its O\,n rate of return.
The results from this study abo reject the hypothesis that shares are insensiti\ e to developments in the money market; the Treasury hill rate is
~ignificant at the 5 percent level or better in all regressions entering TB and
CU as separate independent variables. The size of all of the marketable
security cross-rate elasticities in Tabk 2 are not strictly comparable. Some
cross-rate elasticities arc calculated using the Aaa corporate bond rate
\\,hereas other~ use the 3-month Treasury bill rate. Based on th<' coefficient
estimates in Hamburger's study it is estimated that the Treasury bill crossrate elasticitie~ are approximately -.18 for time and savings deposits at commercial bani,.\ and -.11 for savings deposits at nonbank institutions." The
credit union share cross-rate elasticity calculated in thi~ study is comparable
to ,imilar l!lasticities found on deposits at other institutions; thus. the study
presents no support for the hypothesis that credit union shares are
"relatively insulated" from credit market developments.
~urnmar) and Conclm,ion~
This study estimates the demand for credit union shares to det<'rmine
the sensitivity of demand, if any, to their own and to competitive rates of
return. The evidence indicates that credit union shares in the post Federal
insurance period have been sensitive to their own rate of return and to rates
available on marketable securities. Furthermore, this sensitivity appears 10
be comparable to that exhibited by savings in other depository institutions.
Much of the interest sensitivity of credit union shares can probably be at-
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fable 2 · E!.timate~ of Own-Rate and Marketable Security Cross-Rate
Ela~ticitie~

'I
l

Author
Hamburger

t

1

Type of Deposit
Time & Savings Deposits
at Commercial Banks
Time & Savings Deposits
at Commercial Banks

iI

Savings Deposits at
Nonbank Institutions
Savings Deposits at
Nonbank Institutions

!

Reichenstein

'

Koot

1

Taylor

1.

2.

Credit Union Shares
Credit Union Shares
Credit Union Share\

Own-Rate
Elasticity
.66

Cross-Rate
Elasticity

-.30'

.68

-.181 •'

.87

-.22'

.65

-.11 '•'

.95

-.122

.63

-.38'

.94

N.A.

the Aaa corporate bond rate is used a~ the marketable security rate.
The 3-month Treasury bill rate is used as tbe marketa ble security rate.

3. See footnote 15.
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tributed to the introduction of Federal share insurance and the subsequent
dramatic growth of large accounts.
This evidence is in direct opposition to the "traditional view" which
maintains that credit unions are relatively insensitive to developments in the
money market. Although the traditional view may have described credit
unions before the introduction of Federal share insurance in 1971, the
evidence rejects such a view for today's credit unions. Any insulation from
money market developments which may have been present before I 97 I was
probably not based, as alleged, on credit unions' operations within prescribed fields of membership, but on the fact that their share capital was concentrated in small accounts which are not very responsive to changing credit
conditions.

footnotes
'At the present time, the Regulation Q ceiling on passbook type accounts at Federal credit unions is 7 percent. Most state credit union acts
contain clauses that automatically extend federal privileges to their state
credit uniom. This interest rate advantage may be short lived a, the
Depository Institutions Deregulation Act of 1980 mandates the elimination
of Regulation Q ceilings by April I, 1986. The ceilings before 1hat date will
be set by 1he Deregulation Committee established by the Act.
'For example, ,ee Hamburger [4], Jordan (5], and Motley (7].
'Croteau [2], Taylor (11). and 1he NCUA [4]. contend that share, are
relatively insensitive to mO\ ement, in their O\\ n rate and competitive rate,
of return. Taylor e~timates that the strong own-rate elasticity estimated in
hh study, .94, is probably biased upward. He also state, that credit union
shares "are not pan of the so-called 'hot money' tha1 is shifted rather easily
among alterna1ive assets" (p. 1754). Flanner} presents e\idence indicating
the importance of the di\ idend rate in "saver behavior" regressions. The
dividenu rate has the expected positive and significant coefficient in regressions on average share account size and the proportion of shares in accounts
greater than various minimum amount\.
'National Credit Union Administration, 1974 Annual Report, p. 2.
Other issues of the Annual Report substitute "insulated" for "relatively insulated" in the statement.
'The introduction of Federal share imurance is the most obvious financial development. Another development is the change in managers' attitude
eoncerning growth. In previous times, credit union manager, often resisted
growth in their credit union by placing a maximum limit on the size of
members' share accounts. A survey of credit unions chartered before 1960
39

and qill in operation in 1965 found that as late as April 1966
th . ct·
·
,
, some 54% of
e ne It unions st1 11 had '>Orne form of share limitation. See (I].
•Statbtics on credi_t unions _in thb study are based on data obtained in
the Annual Report~ ot the National Credit Union Administration a d ·
~redecesso_r, the Federal Credit Union Program. Real shares (share:
Justed tor mnauon) grew 89.3% between 1970 and 1976 versus 48.5% between 1964 and 1970.
Inflation can certainly account for '>Orne of the recent increase in the
proprollon of 101al \hare, in large accounb. Ba,ed on the consumer price
111dex, $5.000 at year-end 1970 contained the purchasing power equivalent
of $7,310 at year-end 1976. Assuming that the $5,000. $10,000 accounts in
1976 v.ere evenly diqributed in thb interval, 44.8% of total shares in 1976
were in account~ greater than $7,310. Thus, e\en after adjustment for inflation the proportion of shares in large accounts increased from 27.811'0 to
44.8%.
'Hamburger and Koot employ the -,ame a%umption. The partial adjustment model \\a, examined but the lagged dependent variable dominated
the regression producing pen·erse changes in the signs of other \'anables.
•Data on Federal credit unions arc u\ed in this study. Although data on
Federally-insured, State-chartered credit unions are not as complete, they
aprear to ha\'e been affected in a very similar manner to the Federal credit
unions. For example, the proportions of shares in large accounts at
Federally-insured State credit union, wa-, SJ 07o at year-end 1976. Thus, thi,
study is strong!} believed to be representative of all Federally-insured credit
unions.
'"An investor considering switching from one savings imtrument to a
longer maturity, higher yield in~trument should weigh the d1sutility of the
decrease in liquidity against the extra utility associated with the additional
yield. The marginal disutility of the lost liquidity is only equal to the
marginal utility of the rate differential for the la~t dollar. All other savings
~witched to the longer maturity, higher yield deposits realized a greater total
,eturn or utility for their in\'estor.
' ' In the abseuce of regulatory restraints, movements in interest rate. on
savings instrument~ of given safety and maturity would provide a measure
of CDI; that is, movemenh in interest rates on a homogeneous (except for
interest rate) savings instrument would provide a mea~ure of CDI. Regula•
tion Q ceilings effe<.:tively limited this form of rate competition during the
1971 -76 period as most depositories paid the maximum rates allowable by
law. When Regulation Q ceilings were cha nged, they were changed
simultaneously at all competing depository institutions except credit unions
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to maintain a competitive balance. Because the most direct form of competition among depository institutions,,.. as effectively eliminated during the
period studied, the absence of a COi variable is very unlikely to alter any of
the major conclusions of this study.
"0.1 percent of federal credit union members holding 4.4 percent of
total shares maintained accounts greater than $20.000 at year-end 1973, the
last year before the insurance increase.
"Since the extension of insurance, which only affected a relatively few
individuals, altered the demand for shares. it is highly probable that the introduction of insurance abo changed the demand relationship.
"Ordinary least-squares applted to a model with autocorrelated disturbances yields unbiased estimates of the parameters. but the standard errors
calculated by the usual least squares formula are biased in a downward
direction. Consequently, the I-statistics in the monthly regressions should
be interpreted with caution. The significance of the variables is verified
from the I-statistics in the quarterly regressions.
" Unfortunately Hamburger does not pre~ent the Treasury bill crossrate elasticities, but they can be reasonably estimated from information given in his study. Hi, estimated coefficients using the Aaa rate and Treasury
bill rates respecitvely are -1.26 and -.52 for the bank deposit regression and
-.65 and -.22 for the nonbank deposit regression. However, the average rate
on Treasury bills is lower than the a\erage rate on the corporate securities
during most time periods, including the 1952-62 period studied by Hamburger. Assuming the corporate rates \llere approximately 1.5 times higher
than the Treasury bill rates during the period studied, Hamburger's
Treasury bill cross-rate elasticities are estimated as

-.18

= [(-.S2/1.26). -

.298)1.S and -.11

= ((.22/.65).

-.223]1.5.

Except for the 1.5 multiplier, Hamburger gives enough information to
calculate the Treasury bill cro~s-rate elasticities. A quick reflection will indicate that any reasonable multiplier will place the elasticities in the
neighborhood of the Treasury bill cross-rate elasticit) cakulated in this
study, -.12.
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